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Abstract
The analysis of the volatile memory (RAM) of a computer system, known as memory forensics, is a critical component of modern digital forensics investigations. Since the
evidence provided by memory forensics is vital, it is necessary for there to be automated
solutions that implement the analysis. Volatility is the most widely used memory forensics
framework and also contains the most functionality of all tools publicly available. Volatility,
as well as all other memory forensics frameworks, are extremely complex software systems
as they must parse a substantial number of in-memory data structures and their associated
values. Given the reliance on memory forensics during digital investigations, robust automation of artifact extraction and presentation is required. In this study, novel methods
for scalable fuzz testing were developed and the implementations of these methods were
thoroughly evaluated against the Volatility framework. Fuzz testing is a technique in which
a target program is intentionally fed faulty data in order to discover whether it enters an
unexpected state during processing. The developed fuzzer generates thousands of mutations, each of which is specifically generated to stress test the algorithms of memory forensic
frameworks. Since the developed library of mutation is so extensive, complete fuzz testing
requires copious amounts of compute time and memory. To handle these requirements in
a scalable and flexible manner, the developed system was designed to evenly distribute all
resources, even when scaled to hundreds of compute cores. Distributed fuzzing of Volatility using the developed fuzz framework led to the discovery of many issues in Volatility’s
analysis engine, including it being vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks, silent crashes,
and unhandled exceptions.

vi

Chapter 1.
Introduction
1.1.

Memory Forensics

Memory forensics is the investigation of information stored in volatile memory of a
digital device. Volatile memory of a system serves as an important piece of evidence since
it holds information that cannot be retrieved from the hard disk. Along with traditional
hard disk forensics, memory analysis provides a complete view of system state at the time
memory was acquired. This information includes encryption keys, clipboard data, volatile
registry branches, network connections, memory-only malware, and numerous other artifacts. To acquire volatile memory from a running system, specialized software is executed
that is capable of loading into kernel memory in order to read directly from physical memory addresses. Once a memory capture is obtained, memory forensic algorithms can then
be used to analyze the contained data and extract precise information about the system.
There are currently several commercial and non-commercial tools for memory analysis
and incident response. These tools are programmed in a variety of languages and have
different dependencies. The tools are given memory captures as inputs and generate information about the RAM contents as their outputs. With the growing size of memory
in all digital devices, the amount of data that a forensic expert needs to analyze is everincreasing. This is added to the data retrieved from the hard disk and other devices that
must also be investigated. Therefore, there is a need for automated forensics processes so
that investigators are provided with more refined information to examine.
Achieving automated solutions for memory forensics requires analysis frameworks to
be robust and to not require manual error checking. This is a non-trivial task as capturing
memory often results in partial corruption of acquired data or loss of memory pages. These
issues occur due to acquisition being performed in a non-atomic manner while the system
is still in use. The result of these issues is that the inputs of memory forensics frameworks
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can be naturally faulty and the frameworks must carefully handle corrupt data. In order
to have tools that are resilient to corrupt input, comprehensive testing must be performed
to locate and isolate any unexpected behavior.
1.2.

Fuzz Testing

Fuzz testing is an effective technique to test a program with flawed inputs and find
unexpected outputs. It can uncover issues that are difficult or impossible to find by other
tests, such as stack and heap buffer overflows and memory overwrites [1][2]. When focused
on memory forensic frameworks, fuzzing suites have historically found critical issues that
would negatively impact real investigations if triggered in the wild [3]. The goal of this
research is to create a scalable and efficient fuzzer for memory forensics frameworks that
can force the frameworks to behave unexpectedly.
Our solution is optimized in terms of both fuzzing and distribution. Fuzzing against
a large memory sample involves millions of testing states. Efficiency of such large scale
fuzzing depends on how lightweight the tests are, as well as the ability to perform tests in
parallel. We distribute the numerous tests on hundreds of cores to execute tests in parallel.
1.3.

Contribution of This Thesis

In this thesis we present a high performance, lightweight, portable fuzzer that can tests
any memory forensics framework. The fuzzing technique used in this fuzzer does not depend
on the source code of the program to be tested. We have used our knowledge about memory
samples to design mutations that mimic real world memory acquisition problems. We have
used the HPX library to run hundreds of tests in parallel and achieve high performance
fuzz testing.
This fuzzer is designed with the capability of testing memory forensics tools against
large memory images efficiently. As a result, it is used for finding flaws and vulnerabilities in
memory forensics frameworks that can prevent these tools from being used in automated
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forensic approaches. Findings of this fuzzer are used by developers of the programs to
correct the errors and create robust forensic tools.
1.4.

Outline

Chapter 2 describes fuzz testing methods and explains our approach to fuzz testing.
Chapter 3 explores different methods of test case generation and the deciding factors for
our mutation method and gives the details of our test case generation. Chapter 4 discusses
our approach to high performance fuzz testing. Chapter 5 presents our results. Chapter 6
concludes and outlines our future work.
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Chapter 2.
Fuzz Testing
2.1.

Background and Literature Review

Fuzz testing is a testing method where a program is run with different random input
data to find its unexpected outputs. It has become more widespread lately due to an
increased demand for security testing [1]. This technique was first introduced by Barton
Miller et al. at the University of Wisconsin. Miller’s students developed programs that
tested common UNIX utilities with random inputs with the goal of breaking them. They
could crash or hang between 25-33% of the utility programs on the seven Unix variants
they tested [4].
Despite the generic nature of those tests, they proved to be very cost-effective. They
enhanced the tests and went on to find security flaws in Windows NT applications, too
[5]. Ever since, fuzz testing has risen to become essential in application security testing
[6] and the most effective solution to finding security bugs automatically [7] [2][8] Fuzzing
has become an integral part of several software companies secure development lifecycles,
including Microsoft [9], Google [10] and Adobe [11].
The automation of testing a large number of varied inputs results in executing many
branch conditions and therefore, covering numerous code paths. Automatic testing also has
the advantage of being more time efficient in terms of developing since there is no need to
write test cases for every unit of the code [12]. This is essential to software quality assurance
considering the fast evolving software applications. Many security related problems or
critical defects such as denial of service, degradation of service, memory management bugs,
exceptions, and deadlocks can be found by fuzz testing [13].
The purpose of fuzzing is negative testing. Although it has successfully found functional
errors in software [7], it is supposed to test software against unexpected or semi-valid inputs
instead of the proper data expected by the processing code [2]. In fact, errors seen in
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software as results of tests are not considered findings of fuzzing or significant test results
as the consequence of invalid input is expected to be erroneous. On the contrary, the tests
which do not result in expected errors or those which cause programs to crash are the
significant test cases [7].
2.1.1.

Fuzzing Methods

Fuzzers can be categorized from different aspects. With regards to generating test cases,
which are inputs of the tested program, there are two types of fuzzers. Mutation based
fuzzers use existing inputs and modify them to test software. Generation based fuzzing
uses the analysis of the program to generate its inputs from scratch. Generation based
methods are more time consuming to implement and the existing works on fuzzing mostly
focuses on mutation based tests. Although generation based fuzzers achieve higher code
coverage in a shorter time, their total test cases are eventually fewer than mutation based
fuzzers, and the errors that they find are limited to their design, unlike mutation based
fuzzers that apply random changes on every part of the input. On the other hand, since
mutation based fuzzing uses existing inputs, there might be features and functionalities of
the program that do not even exist in those inputs and therefore are not tested. Generation
based fuzzing takes care of this issue by generating inputs according to the execution paths
of the program under test [7].
With regards to the knowledge of the target software, a black box fuzzer does not have
knowledge about the target program and executes it with different input files. Then based
on the program’s outputs, additional mutations are selected. Black box fuzzing is fast, but
it has less control over code coverage. It introduces the least overhead for testing compared
to white box or gray box fuzzing, since it only needs to run the program without performing
any instrumentation or taint analysis [2].
Black box fuzzing also takes minimal initialization since it does not need to preprocess
the program in order to design test inputs. But a black box fuzzer’s ability to run good tests
is dependent on the quality of the initial inputs provided. Also, the total number of tests
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that should be performed in black box fuzzing is generally much larger than gray/white box
methods. Therefore, black box fuzzing takes longer to finish one complete test. Another
limitation of pure black box testing is the large number of redundant or unnecessary tests.
Since the black box fuzzer does not have any knowledge about the program being tested,
it cannot decide which changes to the initial input file can reach different results. For
example, fuzzing network packets or fuzzing files with grammars or structures can become
much more efficient if its mutations consider packet/file structure.
There are works like [14] that increase the efficiency of black box fuzzing by taking
analysis of the code into consideration. These extensions to black box fuzzers are sometimes
called gray box fuzzing. Although after the popularity of AFL [15], the name gray box
fuzzing mostly refers to semi black box fuzzers that use outputs of previous tests to design
their next tests. Extending black box fuzzers to gray box also includes coverage guided
fuzzing, where the tests are designed by the code paths that are executed. As tests are
still not designed according to source code of the program under test, the code coverage in
coverage guided fuzzing is shown not to be increased very effectively [16]. The reason is that
the fuzzer does not have any knowledge about what type of mutations achieve interesting
results or which mutations can test a new execution path. It can only observe the cases
where a mutation results in a change of the execution path [2, 17].
A limitation of white box fuzzing is that the constraint solver relies heavily on the
program domain or the language that the program was written with. Another problem
is that symbolic execution may be imprecise due to interactions with system calls and
pointer aliasing problems. Thus, white box fuzzing loses one of the best features of blackbox fuzzing, namely, you are actually running the program so there are no false positives.
The choice between a black box fuzzer versus a white box fuzzer depends on the target
program and it cannot be determined without considering the features of the program
under test. There have been studies though, that show that black box fuzzing can often
perform better than costly white box fuzzing [2, 18, 19].
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An example of whitebox fuzzers is SAGE [17]. SAGE uses symbolic execution of an
initial input to gather analysis of the program under test. It then uses the analysis and
information about the program to change the input in order to change the constraints of the
execution of program. This test changes the input for different constraints of the program
in order to test different execution paths. SAGE has had promising results finding security
critical vulnerabilities. A potential limitation of SAGE is that its ability to generate good
inputs depends on the quality of the initial input. This is the case in black box fuzzing
too, and despite adding the analysis overhead, white box fuzzing still carries this issue.
Although the number of mutations that are applied on a file is smaller in this approach
than black box fuzzing, the difference is shown not to be significant. This is the so called
path explosion problem where the number of paths in a program is very large [18, 2, 17].
Many fuzzers are a hybrid of white box and black box. Majumdar and Sen [20] presented a hybrid concolic testing algorithm that interleaves random testing with dynamic
symbolic execution to complement the shortcomings of each approach with the other. The
use of random search (black box) brings the ability to reach deep program states quickly,
and the use of concolic testing (white box) brings the ability to explore states in a neighborhood exhaustively. Their implementation could achieve better results than both black
box and white box testing alone and lead to further studies on hybrid approaches.
2.1.2.

Security Testing

There has been significant research conducted on fuzzing to find security vulnerabilities.
Tsankov et al. [21] performed fuzz testing on security protocols. Their black-box fuzzer
on an Internet Key Exchange protocol found use-after-free memory access problems and
an unhandled exception vulnerability. Rebert et al. [8] conducted a study on different
seed selection strategies in mutational blackbox fuzzing. Their approach was able to find
security-critical software bugs. This work was later improved by adding a process of whitebox analysis of the target program [22], which was used in optimizing the mutation ratio
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selection. The overhead of white-box fuzzing in this work is once per program-seed pair as
a preprocessing step which is an improvement to former white-box fuzzing solutions.
American Fuzzy Lop is one of the most widely used fuzzers currently available [15],
which has been used to find numerous bugs and vulnerabilities in many popular applications. Many fuzzers in the literature have been built on top of AFL because of its effectiveness [23]. AFL and similar fuzzers are not generally applicable to memory forensics tools,
however. First, many memory forensics tools are closed source and these fuzzers require
access to the source code to instrument programs for analysis. Also, AFL’s mutations are
performed on the entire input file and its documentation recommends files under 1 KB in
size for performance reasons. Memory dumps which are the inputs for memory forensics
tools regularly exceed 1GB in size and do not meet this condition. Furthermore, AFL and
the vast number of existing fuzzers target native code and are not directly applicable to
many forensics tools that are written in Python. The Python solutions of AFL like pythonafl [24] also require significant changes to the source code of the program under test which
will not be practical for fuzzing memory forensics frameworks [3].
zzuf is a transparent application input fuzzer that can be used to find bugs for purposes
of quality assurance, security, and code coverage analysis [25]. Basic Fuzzing Framework
(BFF) is the name of a black box fuzzer written on top of zzuf. It has been used in
previous studies on improving black-box mutational fuzzing and has proven effective in
finding vulnerabilities in various programs [8, 26]. Zhao et al. [27] also use BFF to analyze
the distribution of discovery probability in black-box fuzz testing and achieve a stochastic
model of black-box mutational fuzzing. Their results confirm that most vulnerabilities
found by fuzz testing are exploitable and also present a model for the process of fuzzing.
Prakash et al. [28] evaluated the output of memory forensics tools to find which members of structures could be mutated while still keeping the machine stable. They use fuzzing
not with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities, but to evaluate the efficiency and accuracy
of memory analysis tools. This study does not directly test memory forensics frameworks,
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but instead the stability of an operating system to remain stable after data is mutated.
Also, this approach relies on a virtual machine for mutations which makes the performance
of large scale tests unacceptable for our purpose. Also, this approach works on members
of data structures and does not achieve comprehensive fuzz testing.
Brubaker et al. [29] test certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations. They
implemented random mutations that conform to SSL/TLS to test server authentication.
The tests uncovered multiple flaws in popular SSL/TLS libraries and Web browsers, including security vulnerabilities that broke server authentication guarantees and could be
exploited for stealthy man-in-the middle attacks. Newsham et al. [30] tested EnCase and
The Sleuth Kit, to find security flaws with simple attack techniques. They performed
fuzzing as well as manual, targeted manipulation of data formats to test these forensics
tools. They could reveal multiple issues in Encase and the Sleuthkit, including infinite
loops, program crashes, and memory allocation errors. Their effort focused on common
errors in filesystem related parsing, which is similar to our approach that mimics different
memory smears. Their mutations were performed by copying files before processing, which
causes an enormous disk space overhead in large scale tests.
Dolan-Gavitt et al. [31] performed fuzz testing on individual members of Windows’
process descriptor data structures (EPROCESS) to find which mutations to these members
would cause Windows to become unstable. Using this method, it is possible to generate
signatures for kernel data structures that are essential to system’s stability. These signatures can then be used by memory forensics tools as their scanning signatures. As a result,
when a memory analysis tool scans memory for certain signature to find hidden objects
such as processes or threads, it looks for the members which are critical to the system’s
stability, hence can not be manipulated by malware to go undetected. Although the end
result of this work is reliability of memory forensics, its fuzz testing is performed on operating system components only and the fuzzing techniques are not useful for fuzzing the
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memory forensics tools themselves. Furthermore, using a virtual machine is too costly for
fuzzing forensics tools.
Driller [19] takes a new approach for finding security vulnerabilities. It leverages both
fuzzing and selective concolic execution (dynamic symbolic execution) in a complementary
manner, to find deeper bugs. Inexpensive fuzzing is used to exercise compartments of an
application, while concolic execution is used to generate inputs which satisfy the complex
checks separating the compartments. Driller uses selective concolic execution to explore
only the paths deemed interesting by the fuzzer and to generate inputs for conditions that
the fuzzer cannot satisfy. It was also able to find vulnerabilities by the tests. However,
they find later [18] that fuzzing tools identify almost three times as many vulnerabilities as
dynamic symbolic execution techniques since the costs and limitations of concolic execution
are higher than expected. As a result, their studies also confirm that fuzz testing is the
prominent method for finding vulnerabilities.
2.1.3.

Dynamic Taint Analysis

Similar to fuzzing, dynamic taint analysis [32] is able to find conditions where programs
behave erratically. In this method, the parts of the program that handled the unexpected
input are marked. These marks are then used in generating next inputs for achieving tests
with more code coverage. Since this analysis requires modification to the source code of any
memory forensics framework except those written in C or C++, it is not applicable to many
memory forensics tools, such as those written in Python. Because otherwise, for programs
written in other languages the taint analysis would be performed on the interpreter rather
than the program itself. Conti and Russo [33] provided a solution to taint analysis for
Python via a library written entirely in Python, and thus avoiding modifications in the
interpreter. However, these solutions are not applicable to fuzzing closed source memory
forensics tools as they require modification to source code of the tool being tested.
Bekrar et al. [34] studied different approaches to enhance fuzzers and found that adding
taint analysis to fuzzing improves the efficiency of finding exploitable bugs. Dynamic taint
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analysis engines mark and test untrusted inputs, such as those coming from a user or the
network. Trusted inputs are not tested in this method. Because of this design, without
modification, all portions of a memory forensics framework driven by the user, such as
parsing command line options, reading of environment variables and configuration files,
and so on would be tested. This introduces inefficiency in the tests since the tests on
portions of memory forensics frameworks that do not work on input do not yield significant
results or exploitable bugs [3].
2.1.4.

Gaslight

Gaslight [3], the first version of this work, implemented fuzz testing on Volatility and
Rekall. It uses FUSE to apply mutations. FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) is “an interface
for userspace programs to export a filesystem to the Linux kernel” [35]. It provides an
interface to the filesystem in order to mount or unmount the filesystem, read requests from
the kernel, and send responses back. Gaslight tests programs written in Python, so it
uses Fusepy [36]. Fusepy is a Python module that provides a simple interface to FUSE.
Using Fusepy, Gaslight includes a custom FUSE filesystem that handles mutating inputs
by presenting a mutated memory sample to the memory forensics framework under test,
without copying the original sample.
FUSE reduces the overhead of creating custom filesystems significantly, since instead
of writing kernel drivers, the FUSE interface is entirely contained within userland and
filesystem operations can be implemented without kernel modifications. It supports simultaneous mounting of a memory image to efficiently apply mutations to the images
dynamically. Gaslight leverages FUSE to mount the memory image that should be mutated, then modifies specific regions of the memory image according to the mutation using
its custom filesystem.
Gaslight successfully found errors in a number of Volatility plugins for Linux and Mac.
It also tested a Rekall plugin called arp, and it could successfully find errors in that plugin.
It fully utilizes all cores of a system where it is running to make tests more efficient, but it
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cannot exploit parallelism beyond a single system and as the number of fuzzing states that
should be tested for even a single plugin could involve hundreds of thousands or millions
of mutations, it does not scale.
Furthermore, the FUSE filesystem that is used as the custom userland filesystem in
Gaslight has affected its performance in a harmful manner. Low performance in Gaslight
is unacceptable due to the large number of tests that need to be executed. Using a FUSE
filesystem can degrade the performance of a program by 5% up to 83%. Also optimizing FUSE does not always alleviate the overhead and in some cases leads to even lower
performance [37]. It gets worse in programs with high loads like Gaslight because of the
additional round trips between application programs and user filesystem [38]. There are
newer frameworks like Direct-FUSE [38] which alleviate overhead of a FUSE filesystem call
from crossing the user-kernel boundary but they do not have stable Python wrappers yet,
and their improvements to FUSE performance are still not significant enough to solve the
performance problems facing the initial version of Gaslight.
2.2.

Fuzzing Memory Forensics Frameworks

The fuzzer created in this thesis is an improved version of Gaslight. It is a black box
fuzzer that applies mutations dynamically without needing to have knowledge of the source
code of the program being tested. Since manipulating the (potential) input of memory
forensics frameworks is the most probable attack vector for malicious activity or detection
avoidance, and benign memory smearing is common, we focus on finding vulnerabilities
that arise as a result of a corrupt memory sample. The fuzzer in this work does not cover
execution paths that would not be affected by corrupt input.
Testing memory forensics frameworks to find vulnerabilities that are linked to all execution paths (not just the ones affected by corrupt input files) is also important. It is
not possible through fuzz testing though, since fuzzing refers to testing software with a
large number of random inputs. Regardless, memory forensics frameworks can become
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more robust if they are tested against a larger number of conditions. They can be tested
in different operating systems, in different environments, or they can be run with different
command line options. Although many of these tests are run regularly before these tools
are published, including some of variables such as command line options or environment
variables in fuzzing can be a future work for making the fuzzer more comprehensive.
2.3.

Design and Implementation

Our black box fuzzing approach monitors the portions of the input file that are accessed
by the forensics tools during a particular run, and then changes them while they are being
accessed in subsequent identical runs. Gaslight is currently configured to test the Volatility
framework, one of the most commonly used memory forensics frameworks, but it can be
configured to test other tools since it is independent of the code or domain of the program
that it tests. In this section, the design and implementation of the fuzzer to test the
Volatility framework as it is currently developed is described.
Gaslight is run by the user with the following command line arguments:
• SUT directory is the path to the System Under Test (in this case the path to installed
Volatility framework). Using this argument, the fuzzer does not depend on a specific
path or environment variable to find Volatility, which is the program under test and
should be run with different inputs.
• Sample is the memory sample file that is the input of tested program and the tests
are run on it.
• Profile is the string identifier of the sample file’s profile. A profile is “a collection of
the VTypes, overlays, and object classes for a specific operating system version and
hardware architecture (x86, x64, ARM)”. Volatility needs to know the profile for a
memory sample to be able to analyze it [39].
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• Output directory is the path where the outputs and results of fuzzing should be
exported.
• Plugin is the Volatility plugin that should be tested. This argument is optional. If no
plugin is requested in the command, Gaslight iterates over a default array of plugins
and tests them all.
Three arrays of the 10 most used plugins for each operating system supported by Volatility
are used in the program. If the command line argument for plugin is empty, fuzzer checks
the first three letters of the profile string, and sets the array of plugins that belongs to the
current profile as plugins to test. It then runs its tests for each plugin. At the beginning
of testing each plugin, it is necessary to know how many read file operations are made by
Volatility when running that plugin on a specific sample file. This read number is going
to be used by fuzzer as a road map for tests, so the fuzzer calls the readcounter module to
find the total number of read system calls that are made by Volatility in a single complete
execution of a specific plugin. The steps in the initialization phase of fuzzing are shown in
figure 2.1..
Gaslight is a Linux application and its fuzzing modules are written in C. Tests run
Volatility on Linux, but Volatility is tested against memory samples belonging to any
operating system. When an application reads a file, it first gets access to the file by opening
it. The programming languages that applications are written in (in this case Python)
provide functions for opening files. These functions do their jobs by calling open system
calls (syscalls) that are provided by operating system. Specifically, it is the execution of
these system calls that result in the opening of files. Therefore, regardless of the language
that an app is written in, open system calls are eventually executed when it opens a file.
The same applies to reading files in Linux. Linux read functions in all languages call read
system calls internally [40]. Therefore, when a program reads a file, it eventually invokes
read system calls.
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Figure 2.1. Fuzzing initialization
Most functions that different languages provide for reading files add several functionalities such as buffering, indexing, etc., to reading. Therefore, they usually call read system
calls several times in order to perform one read. As a result, one function call in the program’s code may be compiled into many read system calls, each of which reads one part
of the file [40]. Likewise, when one plugin of Volatility runs, no matter how many reads it
performs on the sample file, the actual read system calls are executed multiple times.
Every Volatility plugin works differently to extract different types of information about
a memory sample. Based on the information that the plugin extracts, the extent of their
“reach” into a sample differs. Some plugins navigate through kernel structures to retrieve
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information like the list of network connections, while there are plugins that scan large
regions of memory for certain signatures. These scanning plugins perform a significantly
larger number of read calls on the memory sample file. Therefore, knowing the total
number of read system calls that are made by a plugin gives the fuzzer information about
the activity of the plugin on a memory sample, and the fuzzer can use these individual
reads to construct fine-grained tests. So, it first performs a complete run of the intended
Volatility plugin on the specified sample without mutating anything in order to count the
number of read system calls that the tool makes. This step needs to be done once at the
start of testing each plugin against a particular memory sample.
Many Windows Volatility plugins internally call another plugin called kdbgscan first to
find the debugger data block which contains pointers to the start of the active process and
loaded module lists and then walk those active process and loaded module lists. Kdbgscan
is one of the scanning types of plugins that scans through the sample file for the kernel
debugger data block ( KDDEBUGGER DATA64). Volatility gives the possibility of providing the kdbgscan value as a command line option when calling other plugins in order
to avoid running kdbgscan repeatedly, which saves time [39]. We use this functionality to
make tests more efficient. As another step in fuzzer initialization, the kdbgscan plugin is
called on the specified memory sample, and the value is stored.
The same functionality is provided for the DTB (DirectoryTableBase). This value
is needed for many plugins too, but if it is specified to Volatility via the command line,
the plugins avoid scanning for it. Many plugins retrieve the DTB value of a sample file
and print it in their output. We call the psscan plugin and get the PDB value for the
system process. This is equal to the value of DTB. The output of psscan and the Volatility
command to retrieve the DTB are shown in figure 2.2. and figure 2.3. respectively.
These two initialization steps are done once for the entire set of tests against one
memory sample. While running the tests, kdbgscan and DTB values are provided when
calling Volatility. As a result, the plugins that need these values avoid scanning for them
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Figure 2.2. Volatility psscan plugin output

Figure 2.3. Volatility command to output DTB
and time is saved in every test on those plugins. In most cases the number of tests on each
plugin is in order of hundreds of thousands, which means the time saved, hence increased
efficiency, is multiplied by this number.
After initialization, fuzz testing is distributed by the distribution module. Volatility
is tested under different combinations of read number and mutation and its output is
monitored. That is, the mutation module runs the specified Volatility plugin and each
time it mutates one of the reads that Volatility performs. After reads from 1 to the total
number of reads –which was found in initialization phase –are all tested for with the first
mutation, the fuzzer starts over to test Volatility against read numbers from 1 to the
total number of reads for the second mutation. This process continues until all tests are
exhausted. Implementation of mutations and how they are applied will be discussed in
section 3.2..
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Fuzzing is controlled by the read numbers that are tested. Since the total number of
read calls made by a plugin is very large, it is not optimal to run the plugin for all read
numbers and test each of the read numbers with all mutation states. To make this process
more efficient, fuzzer is guided by three factors:
• Exit code returned from testing on last read numbers
Fuzzing module starts testing read numbers in steps of 1. After each test, the exit
code of Volatility is returned to fuzzing module. If the outputs of consecutive tests
all result in no error, it means Volatility exited normally despite the anomaly in its
input in that particular read location. So, the fuzzer increases the steps to 2. This
step number can increase up to 5 in our current configuration. Whenever an exit with
error is returned, fuzzing module decreases the steps according to the error code.
• Duration of running time of Volatility
If the Volatility plugin takes too long to execute, then the mutation in that particular
read instance could result in resource exhaustion or an infinite loop. Gaslight has a
timeout, which is currently 90 minutes in the current configuration, for each test. If a
Volatility plugin takes longer than the timeout, the test is interrupted and execution
continues with the next tests. The value of steps in read numbers is decreased so
that the execution paths close to the one that was triggered by reading that portion
of input are tested.
• Size of output (dump) file created by Volatility
In testing Volatility plugins that create dump files as their outputs, the sizes of dump
files are inspected by the fuzzer. If a dump is too large, it means the mutation in
that read number caused file system resource exhaustion. In case of creation of large
files, since a portion of input file has been found that yields interesting results, the
fuzzer decreases its step. Consequently, the next tests are run on read numbers that
are closer to the last portion in order to prevent missing other special cases that
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might result from mutations in that area. The threshold for dump files in our current
configuration is 100 MB.
Since our coverage is guided by exit codes, the fuzzer might skip testing some of the
read numbers after an execution with a normal exit. But there are cases where the program
under test exits normally despite having an unexpected behavior. These silent crashes are
detected in the analysis phase and they will be discussed in section 5.. Gaslight can be
categorized as a black box fuzzer, but its fuzzing is not carried out completely blindly. Its
approach is feedback guided fuzzing which is sometimes regarded as gray box fuzzing. The
controlling factors for guided fuzzing are generic features that can be used for any program.
Therefore, although our current implementation tests Volatility, this fuzzer can be used to
test other forensic tools or tools of other categories that work with input files too.
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Chapter 3.
Test Case Generation
Generating high-impact mutation sets is very important. To ensure that our fuzzer
properly tests memory analysis frameworks, we have designed mutations that are tailored
to expose issues commonly encountered in memory acquisition. Investigating a system
requires inspection of its running state, i.e. the contents of its RAM. The importance
of information that can be revealed from RAM are discussed in section 1.1.. In order to
perform analysis on the RAM of a computer, the contents of RAM need to be stored on a
non-volatile storage. The process of capturing the memory of a running system and creating
a dump file out of it is called memory acquisition. This is an important and precarious
step in the memory forensics process [39].
Input files analyzed by memory forensics tools are memory samples that are produced
by performing memory acquisition. These samples are captured from running systems
that should be investigated. Since the system is running as acquisition of volatile memory
is performed, the contents of RAM change as it is being acquired. As a result, there
might be natural inconsistencies in the captured sample. If the computer is compromised,
memory acquisition is even more challenging. The acquisition procedure should not rely on
compromised operating systems or unreliable software running on a system. Malware can
freely tamper with in memory data and change it. So, the quality of memory acquisition
can have a significant impact on memory forensics.
Fuzzer needs to test not only general vulnerabilities in memory forensics tools, but
also their robustness against corrupt acquired memory images. Therefore, mutations are
designed not only to cover the code paths that process input files, but also to test code
against memory samples that are compromised in similar ways as acquired memory.
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3.1.

Background and Literature Review

There has been an abundant of research on effective memory acquisition on different operating systems. Many operating systems provide access to physical memory. In
Linux, /dev/mem holds the image of the main memory of the computer. Byte addresses
in /dev/mem are interpreted as physical memory addresses. Since Linux 2.6.26, access to
memory regions through /dev/mem has changed. For example, RAM access is not allowed
on x86 but accessing memory-mapped PCI regions is. The file /dev/kmem contains the
kernel virtual memory rather than physical memory. Since Linux 2.6.26, this file is available
only if the CONFIG DEVKMEM kernel configuration option is enabled [41].
Acquisition procedures provided by operating systems are convenient and easy to use,
but they do not satisfy reliability and usefulness requirements. These acquisitions rely on
the local operating system to supply the memory contents despite the ability of malware
to freely tamper with in memory data and manipulate the memory image. Also, modern malware is no longer limited to the userland of an operating system and kernel level
rootkits now impact the reliability of acquisitions performed by kernel. These acquisition
procedures depend on correct functioning of operating systems that might be compromised
[42]. Acquisition procedures also require the memory capture process to run. Running the
capture process might need running other programs like shell or network transport. This
results in changing the contents of memory and changing memory allocations [43].
Carrier et. al [43] propose a procedure for acquiring volatile memory to address the
shortcomings of said procedures using a hardware expansion card that can copy memory to
an external storage device. Although their hardware card needs to be installed into a PCI
bus slot before an incident occurs, this solution can be more reliable than a software-based
solution as it does not rely on software or operating system to acquire memory. Their work
also highlights the issues that occur in memory acquisition.
A commonly used Linux memory acquisition tool is fmem [44]. fmem is a loadable
kernel module that creates a /dev/fmem device supporting memory capture. It supports
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multiple architectures such as ARM, i386, and x86 64. Schatz [42] proposed an approach
to snatch control of the host hardware from the running operating system. The approach
named bodysnatcher first injects an independent, task specific minimalist OS into the kernel space of the running kernel. It then saves the state of the running operating system, and
then boots the acquisition OS in an independent and restricted subset of the machines memory. The acquisition OS then employs a small and common subset of the hosts hardware
as an output channel for dumping an image of the physical memory of the host. Although
this approach addresses some acquisition problems in theory, it requires completely new
operating systems. It cannot solve problems of acquisition on current operating systems.
Goyal et al. [45] proposed kdump to tackle the acquisition problem of corrupted memory due to software. Kdump is based on kexec. Kexec is a system call that enables loading
and booting into another kernel from the currently running kernel. It runs the boot loader
from within the kernel without the need for hardware initialization that is done by the
BIOS or firmware during a normal boot. Therefore, it is capable of booting a new kernel
inside a kernel with a faster speed than a normal boot [46]. Kdump modified kexec to
enable it to boot a new kernel even in an event of a system crash or panic. It boots the
capture kernel from a reserved region of memory rather than a default location. Therefore,
there is a smaller chance that the captured memory is corrupted by direct memory access
in host kernel [45].
Much recent work on memory acquisition is focused on smartphones. Sylve et al.
[47] discuss memory acquisition on Android and present a kernel module for dumping
memory named dmd. dmd parses the kernels iomem resource structure first to find the
physical memory address ranges of system RAM. It then performs physical to virtual
address translation for each page of memory, and finally reads all pages in each range and
writes them to either a file (typically on the devices SD card) or a TCP socket.
sun et al. [48] designed a hardware-assisted memory acquisition mechanism named
TrustDump to acquire the RAM and CPU registers of the OS on smartphones, even if the
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OS has crashed or has been compromised. It divides the mobile platform into two isolated
execution environments, normal domain and secure domain. The OS running in the normal
domain is usually called Rich OS, and the one running in the secure domain is called Secure
OS. Its memory acquisition module called TrustDumper is installed in the secure domain
to perform memory dump and malware analysis of the Rich OS.
Case and Richard [49] explored page swapping and demand paging as obstacles to
complete acquisition of memory. Page swapping is operating system’s solution to use more
memory than is available in RAM. It stores least accessed memory pages in disk storage. It
results in RAM not including all the contents of the actual memory of the system. Demand
paging is when the operating system does not load data from files on RAM until they are
explicitly needed by a read or write operation on the portion of file where they reside. Using
this method by the operating system results in RAM including parts of files or processes
rather than their complete layouts.
The Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) program at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) developed specifications for disk imaging tools [50].
The specifications define requirements for digital media acquisition tools used in computer
forensics investigations [51], and test assertions and a test methodology based on these
requirements [52]. These tool specifications and test requirements became bases for many
forensic disk acquisition products. Although specifications for memory acquisition are to
be published by NIST too [53], some memory acquisition solutions use similar standards
for memory imaging [43].
3.1.1.

Page Smearing

Libster and Kornblum [54] proposed an approach to integrate the memory imaging
software in the operating system to achieve a more reliable memory snapshot. One of
their stated problems in memory acquisition that they attempted to tackle was getting a
fuzzy snapshot state of the system. They explained that when memory captures takes a
long time, as other processes are modifying memory while the capture is proceeding, the
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captured data becomes inconsistent. It can even result in inadvertently crashing the system
when reading certain address ranges [54]. This problem was then observed and studied in
other research works [55, 42, 56].
Cohen [57] discussed that pagetable smear can have much larger consequences to memory analysis than kernel or process memory page smear. He found a new type of smear that
he called pagetable smear which depended on the order of acquisition. He found that since
the page tables are usually located at low memory addresses, these page tables will be the
first to be acquired from memory and written to an image. But as the acquisition runs, the
kernels working set trimmer might decide to trim the processs working set resulting in the
change in processes’ page table entries. So, by the time the acquisition tool gets to higher
addresses pointed by page tables, those pages are re-purposed. As a result, memory forenscis tools might interpret invalid pages pointed to by page table entries without detecting
that those pages no longer belong to the process working set.
Case and Richard [49] explore current issues and research challenges in memory forensics. They discuss problems and the path forward in areas of memory acquisition and
memory analysis. They call page smearing one of the most pressing issues and discuss
it. Page smearing is said to be commonly encountered on systems that have 8 gigabytes
or more of RAM installed as well as systems that are under heavy load. There are not
any solutions to automatically detect smear in captured memory. The current workaround
used is leveraging hypervisor capabilities for taking memory snapshots. But this is not
practical in real world operating systems that do not run on virtual machines and need to
be investigated.
Gruhn and Freiling [56] evaluated 12 memory forensics acquisition tools and methods
and compared them in terms of atomicity and integrity. Their study reveals different issues
that exist in memory acquisition performed by different tools. They report observations of
smear that happened in acquisition processes of several tools such as FTK Imager, DumpIt,
win64dd, and WinPmem which are kernel level software acquisition tools [56]. Smear was
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an issue in acquisition procedures that took longer as well. In the current era of increasing
performance needs, the size of RAM installed on systems is increasing. This leads to an
inevitable increase in the duration of memory capture even by fast acquisition tools. As a
result, page smearing becomes even more common in acquired memory images of current
systems with larger RAM sizes.
3.2.

Design and Implementation

Mutations are designed so that they can reveal forensics tools’ vulnerabilities against
corrupt input. The corruption can happen in different ways as detailed in the previous
section. Also, applying mutations should not need copying the original memory samples,
as it would otherwise lead to huge resource consumption making the process impractical.
In this section, our design of mutations and method of applying them is explained.
Our mutations are applied by leveraging the functionality of intercepting system calls
that Linux provides. As explained in section 2.3., all file operations in Linux are handled
through file system calls. So if we intercept system calls, we can have control over all
file access in a program. LD PRELOAD is an environment variable in Linux. If you set
LD PRELOAD to any shared object library, that library will be loaded before all other
libraries, even the C runtime library (libc). So, any system call to file system can be
overridden and intercepted by userspace programs.
Using this environment variable, we have created a custom file system. This file system
is in userspace and does not need any privilege escalations. The custom file system consists
of overloaded system calls. The list of overloaded system calls are presented in table 3.1..
LD PRELOAD is set to the custom file system library that overrides these calls before
Volatility is called for testing. So, the custom file system is loaded before any other system
library, and therefore the overloaded system calls in this library are invoked when any of
these read or open system calls are called.
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Table 3.1. Custom file system overridden system calls
Read

Open Stream

Open File

Close File

read

fopen

open

close

pread

fopen64

open64

fclose

pread64

freopen

fread

freopen64

By preloading our custom file system library, its overloaded functions are called instead
of all read and open calls that are made by the program under test. This means all the read
and open calls that the program makes on files other than memory samples are intercepted
too. The fuzzer avoids intercepting access to any file that is located outside its testpath.
The directory where input files of the program under test are stored, is passed to the
preloaded library by an environment variable. The fuzzer sets this environment variable to
the directory of input files. When an overloaded function is called, it checks the path of the
file that this function is called on. If the file resides in a directory other than testpath, the
original system call is invoked and its result is returned. But if the file is in the specified
directory, the fuzzer monitors and intercepts all of these system calls made and performs
mutations through these functions.
In order to find original functions, dlsym() is used. dlsym can find the address of a
given symbol in a shared object or executable. RTLD NEXT finds the next occurrence of
the function in the search order after the current library. Fuzzer calls dlsym with the name
of the function and glibc library and uses the returned address to call original functions.
The original functions are needed not only for files that should not be mutated, but also
for the tested file itself. All the overridden functions first execute the original call to get
the values needed by the program under test, and then take required actions.
At the first step of tests, readcounter module obtains the total number of read calls that
the Volatility plugin under test makes on the tested file. The fuzzer preloads readcounter
library and runs the specific Volatility plugin once. The library monitors opened files in
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test directory and increments a counter each time a read call is performed on each file.
After there are no more open instances of the file, it writes the total number of reads in
an output file. This is the reason for overloading close file functions. close and fclose are
intercepted only in the readnumber module to find when the program under test is done
with a file and the total read number is final.
Create file system calls are not intercepted by the fuzzer since they are not of any
use for fuzzing purposes. Memory forensics frameworks which are the subjects of our
tests analyze existing memory samples. Fuzzing tests whether those frameworks behave
unexpectedly given a corrupt input. Therefore, access to created files by these frameworks
can be of no use to the fuzzer. The fuzzer does check the size of memory dumps created by
forensics frameworks however. But doing that using interception of create function would
be inefficient. In order to check the sizes of dump files created by Volatility, the fuzzer reads
the output of Volatility after it is done creating dumps. The output includes the names
of dump files created. The fuzzer then reads the sizes of those files and acts accordingly if
they are not in the ordinary size range. Using this method, the fuzzer deals with the dump
files only after Volatility is done running, and it does not need to do any processing other
than reading their names from the text output and getting their sizes.
Another open function not overridden by the fuzzer is fdopen. fdopen returns a new
stream for an already open file. The fuzzer does not need to know how many streams are
created for a file. It has access to read bytes of an open file by intercepting read system
calls and does not need streams to access a file. The streams also do not make a difference
as long as the fuzzer knows if the file is opened or closed. So monitoring the streams on a
file that is already open will not add any functionalities.
After retrieving the total number of reads that take place in one full run of a Volatility
plugin, the fuzzer starts the testing process. It loops through different combinations of
read numbers and mutations. In each loop, it sets two specific environment variables
to these values, then preloads the custom file system module and executes the Volatility
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plugin. Consequently, its overloaded read and open functions are called whenever Volatility
performs an open or read.The fuzzer keeps track of opened files in the specified test path.
A read counter stores the number of reads that Volatility performs while running. When
this counter reaches the number in the specific environment variable, it mutates the data
which was read at that particular read.
Overloaded read functions call the original function first to get the buffer that is the
actual result of reading the memory sample. If the current read counter is not equal to the
value of the specific environment variable, resulting buffer from the original function call
is returned. Otherwise, the buffer is mutated first and the mutated result is returned. As
a result, Volatility calls its intended read function. But instead of getting the actual buffer
of the memory sample, a mutated version of the buffer is returned to it.
As described earlier, memory smearing occurs when an acquisition tool fails to acquire
a page correctly and instead reads random data or data from the wrong offset in physical
memory. To robustly test memory analysis tools, we introduce smear by leveraging our
knowledge of the location of key data structures in the sample and then mutating them
based on the specific data type.
We have designed 38 bit level mutations shown in table 3.2.. These mutations are
similar to different benign or malicious memory corruptions and memory smears. They
change bytes of the read data returned from original read system calls. One mutation
zeros out all bytes in that particular buffer returned by read function. Another one sets all
bytes to 0xFF. 4 mutations add the current bytes in buffer to 2, 4, 8, 128, 4096 values. 4
mutations subtract 2, 4, 8, 128, 4096 from buffer values. For each of the above operations,
there are mutations that make those changes on each boundary of 2, 4, 8 and 128 bytes
of returned buffer.4 mutations change bytes on each boundary of 2, 4, 8, and 128 bytes to
random values.
There are two options for each mutation. These options and the bytes that they affect
are shown in table 3.3..
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all zero

Table 3.2. Mutations
mutate every 128 all random

mutate current plus 128 fill

all ffs

mutate every 2 all random fill

mutate current plus 4096 fill

mutate every 2 all zero

mutate every 4 all random fill

mutate current sub 2 fill

mutate every 4 all zero

mutate every 8 all random fill

mutate current sub 4 fill

mutate every 8 all zero

mutate every 128 all random fill

mutate current sub 8 fill

mutate every 128 all zero

mutate every 2 current plus 2

mutate current sub 128 fill

mutate every 2 all ffs

mutate every 2 current plus 4

mutate current sub 4096 fill

mutate every 4 all ffs

mutate every 2 current plus 8

mutate every 2 current sub 2

mutate every 8 all ffs

mutate every 2 current plus 128

mutate every 2 current sub 4

mutate every 128 all ffs

mutate every 2 current plus 4096

mutate every 2 current sub 8

mutate every 2 all random

mutate current plus 2 fill

mutate every 2 current sub 128

mutate every 4 all random

mutate current plus 4 fill

mutate every 2 current sub 4096

mutate every 8 all random

mutate current plus 8 fill

• If fuzz past is set, the specified mutation is applied on bytes read at the particular
read counter and all further reads. So, it affects the bytes returned from the read
system call at the particular read counter, as well as bytes returned from all read
system calls that are invoked afterwards.
• if consistent is set, when read counter reaches the particular read number, the fuzzer
stores the current cursor position of the sample file and mutates the read buffer. Then
in all later reads, the fuzzer checks the position of the cursor in the file and mutates
the read buffer if it is read from the same position. This option is created to mimic
static file manipulation. Volatility might read a specific chunk of file multiple times,
and if the sample was actually corrupt all these reads would result in the same value.
Therefore, this consistent option is implemented to prevent conflicts and possible
disruption of analysis.
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Table 3.3. Different types for each mutation
fuzz past consistent

mutated bytes

number of mutated bytes

0

0

read bytes

# read bytes

1

0

All bytes read from then on

# all bytes read after read number

0

1

All bytes at the same position of read byte

# read bytes

1

1

All bytes read from then on

# all bytes read after read number

Since the number of read system calls that execute on a sample file is generally larger
than the actual read calls that are made on a high level language, intercepting system calls
gives Gaslight the advantage of lightweight precision. Instead of mutating specific parts
of a large file that would normally happen in the absence of intercepting system calls, the
fuzzer mutates a specific number of smaller chunks that are returned from read system
calls. Not only mutating these smaller chunks is less costly, but also the division of files
into different parts is readily available for the fuzzer for creating diverse mutations. The
total number of read calls made by Volatility while running some of its plugins on a 1.07
GB memory sample is shown in table 3.4..
It is worth noting that the input files of the program under test are not opened by the
fuzzer separately. In other words, the input file instances only exist in the tested program
and they are loaded on memory as the program loads them. The fuzzer gets access to the
already opened sample files by intercepting system calls without reloading them. Thus, our
method manipulates the data that is already on RAM and does not load any additional
data on memory.
Furthermore, the source code of the program tested is not manipulated and it is not
passed any different parameters when being tested. Execution of the program is done in
the normal way and the chunks of file that it reads are dynamically manipulated. Also,
the parts of file that are not read by the tested application are not mutated since no read
function is called on them. Therefore, despite the low level architecture of the fuzzer that
has no knowledge about the source code of the program being tested, it has a high grip
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Table 3.4. Total number of read system calls invoked by Volatility plugins on a 1.07 GB
memory sample
Plugin

Reads

atoms

28490

drivermodule

15746

impscan

3266

threads

722216

procdump

121020

sockscan

541

pslist

7677

dlllist

271319

ldrmodule

806512

timers

87851

deskscan

10923

over testing different execution paths with high precision. Especially with programs like
memory forensics frameworks that consume large memory samples as inputs, this fuzzing
technique saves greatly on memory and overhead by avoiding duplication of the file.
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Chapter 4.
High Performance Fuzzing
Fuzzing memory forensics frameworks involves running the program under test repeatedly and applying mutations on different read calls. The number of read system calls
invoked by an average plugin on a 1.07 GB memory sample is 167469. Plugins should be
tested by mutating each of these read calls. Since our fuzzing algorithm skips reads that are
unlikely to lead to significant findings, the number of tested read calls on average is 55820.
These instances are tested against 128 mutation states, which requires running Volatility
7144960 times to cover all conditions. Running these many tests is impossible without an
efficient parallel solution.
Scalability is an important factor in the performance of a fuzzer. Our fuzzer needs to
achieve the highest level of parallel execution while maintaining reliability with minimal
overhead. Running tests with the best time and energy efficiency highly depends on the
approach to distributed and parallel computation. The appropriate method corresponds
to program’s features and conditions. The tests that the fuzzer needs to run in parallel
involve running memory forensics frameworks that are written in different languages. These
tools get access to files on disk, create new files, and write on disk several times during
a single execution. Furthermore, these tools have a diverse set of functionalities each of
which performs totally different operations. Therefore, there are significant disparities in
the processing load, file system access, and memory load of various individual executions.
In this chapter, we explore different distribution methods and explain our approach to high
performance fuzzing.
4.1.

Background and Literature Review

The growing demand for high performance computing has lead to a significant advancement in this field. As programs become more computation heavy and data intensive, their
large scale computing solutions evolve and become more specialized for different function32

alities. Currently, there exist a large number of high level programming paradigms that
can be utilized in different parallel applications. A basic point of difference in programming
paradigms is the memory access policies of multiprocessors. They fall into two groups of
shared-memory and message passing paradigms. In shared-memory model, all processors
work with a common shared memory, and this shared memory is the means for all communication among processors. While in message passing, all communication among processors
is handled by transferring send and receive commands [58].
Message passing is the most common programming paradigm used in parallel systems.
high level programming paradigms that are based on message passing can help make efficient parallel programs. A popular message passing library which is also an environment
is Parallel Virtual Machine (PVM) [59]. PVM can be used to run parallel applications
on systems ranging from high-end supercomputers to clusters of workstations. The most
popular high level message-passing system for scientific and engineering application is Message Passing Interface (MPI) [60]. It is a specification for message passing, designed to be
standard for distributed memory parallel computing using explicit message passing. This
interface attempts to establish a practical, portable, efficient, and flexible standard for
message passing [61].
Different implementations of the MPI standard have been in use for decades. MPICH
[62] is a high-performance and widely portable implementation of MPI. MPICH contains
many implementations of device specific functions called Abstract Device Interfaces (ADI)
to achieve high portability and ease of implementation. In general, message passing architectures provide simpler design than shared memory models, while their programming is
more complicated. MPICH uses ADIs to isolate device dependent specifications from other
parts of MPI implementation that can be shared among many devices [62].
Another implementation of MPI which is open source is Open MPI [63]. It uses a component architecture called the Modular Component Architecture (MCA) which is flexible
and enables convenient extending of the implementation. It also has improved point-to-
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point communications performance for a wide variety of interconnects. In addition, there
are MPI implementations created by different vendors such as HP [64], Microsoft [65] , and
Intel [66] which provide MPI libraries for Microsoft Azure, Windows, and Linux.
Since these existing approaches do not satisfy present-day performance and scalability
needs [67, 68], other parallel programming models like OpenMP [69], which is a shared
memory programming model, have become more common. There have also emerged new
language extensions like OpenCL [70] which is an open, royalty-free standard for crossplatform, parallel programming of diverse processors.
4.1.1.

Parallex Execution Model

Improvement in computing technology is not limited to software. Semiconductors and
computer hardware has evolved in the past decades besides software solutions. Kaiser et
al. [71] proposed a new execution model to address the new challenges introduced by the
evolving technology, and to fully benefit from it. This execution model called Parallex
enables a new computing dynamic through the application of message-driven computation
in a global address space context with lightweight synchronization to address critical bottlenecks of starvation, overhead, latency, and contention in effective use of new generation
HPC systems.
Parallex dynamically schedules multiple threads using a message-driven work-queue
methodology of applying user tasks to physical processing resources. This results in the
advantage of efficiency and latency hiding over message passing paradigm as it separates the
work from the resources and processors continue to do useful work even in the presence of
remote service requests and data accesses. Parallex tackles the problem of load balancing by
a fully dynamic adaptive resource management enabled by Active Global Address Space
(AGAS). It handles parallel processes differently than conventional practices. It allows
application modules to be defined with a shared name space and to exploit many layers
of parallelism within the same context. It also takes advantage of Local Control Objects
to organize flow control and achieve variable granularity. Parallex’s capability of variable
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granularity results in scalability for many applications. Since fine grained granularity does
not always result in better performance [72, 71].
4.1.2.

High Performance Parallex

HPX (High Performance Parallex) is a runtime system implementation of the ParalleX
execution model. It is an open source runtime system that delivers the mechanisms required to support the parallel execution, synchronization, resource allocation, and name
space management. It supports static pre-binding at link time while having the capability
of dynamically extending the functionality of application specific modules. Its modular
architecture allows for easy compile time customization, minimizing the runtime footprint.
it strictly adheres to Standard-C++ [73] providing a homogeneous API and utilizes Boost
[74], enabling it to combine powerful compile time optimization techniques and optimal
code generation with excellent portability [72].
HPX has shown considerable improvement in scalability and efficiency compared to
conventional alternatives [75, 76]. When testing weak scaling of an application from 1 node
to 1024 nodes (each 16 cores), HPX outperformed the equivalent MPI code by a factor
of 1.4. Unlike other methods that have several bottlenecks due to implicit and explicit
global barriers to parallel code, HPX unifies remote and local operations, which results in
eliminating almost all serial portions of code. Its per-task overhead is very small and it
does not grow with an increase in the number of cores [75].
4.2.

Design and Implementation

We use HPX runtime system for scaling and parallelizing our fuzzer’s tests. Since
various tests that the fuzzer runs do not have equal loads, the load balancing ability of
the distribution framework plays an important part in the scalability of our fuzzer. HPX
provides An Active Global Address Space (AGAS) that supports load balancing through
object migration. In our tests, the difference in loads is due to the difference in operations
of plugins’ analysis. Our current tested tool, Volatility, has about 117 Windows plugins, 69
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Linux plugins and 71 Mac plugins. Each plugin reads certain information from a memory
sample and performs certain operations on fetched data. Therefore, running different
plugins imposes completely different workloads.
The computationally intensive part in each test is running Volatility plugins. The
plugin needs to run once for every test. Volatility is written in python and each plugin
takes up a certain amount of workload to finish. We parallelize the execution of plugins
using HPX. After the initialization phase, fuzzer gets the number of HPX localities assigned
to the current job, and divides the tests among localities. In HPX, a locality is a contiguous
physical domain, managing intra-locality latencies, while guaranteeing compound atomic
operations on local state. Different localities may expose entirely different temporal locality
properties. It is equivalent to a node in a cluster [72]. Dividing all tests among localities
at the beginning, allows the fuzzer to avoid starting too many tasks and overflowing the
head locality with tasks.
Divided tasks are wrapped in HPX futures. A future refers to an object that acts as
a proxy for a result that is initially not known, usually because the computation of its
value has not yet completed. The future synchronizes the access to this value by optionally
suspending the requesting thread until the value is available. This allows the computation
to proceed unblocked until the actual value is required to produce a result. Futures also
permit anonymous producer-consumer computation when neither the producer of a value,
nor its consumer are known at compile time. In addition, the future construct allows a
trade-off between eager and lazy evaluation by postponing the calculation of a value until it
is actually required [72]. For each locality assigned to the fuzzer’s job, one future is created
and the read numbers that are allocated to that locality are passed along to its future.
Creating a future for each set of tests, takes care of transferring every set to one locality,
performing the jobs on that locality, while keeping the future’s status available in the head
locality. The fuzzer takes advantage of this feature to keep track of assigned localities.
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After dividing tasks among localities, i.e. nodes, the job is distributed in all nodes
rather than executing on the head node only. On each locality, the number of processors
is fetched using HPX and the read numbers that were assigned to that locality are further
divided among all processors. Again, to keep track of the jobs running on each processor
and to know when they are finished, HPX futures are used. One future per processor,
hence one thread per processor, is created, and the read numbers that need to be tested
by that thread are passed along to the future. Then each thread is in charge of testing the
specified read numbers.
In this step, the fuzzer could have taken two other approaches which would not yield
the current efficiency. One is handling the tests in locality level rather than thread level.
Meaning, running as many tests as the number of cores at a time on a locality, and waiting
for them to finish in a loop until all read numbers are tested. This can seem as an intuitive
solution since in the locality level, HPX can handle distributing the jobs on cores without
explicit directives, and the main point of parallelization is distributing the jobs on nodes
with proper communication. This aspect of high performance testing has already been
handled in the above step completely. So, regardless of the method of handling threads,
fuzzing tests would run on all nodes simultaneously hence speeding up testing. But if this
approach was taken, every thread would have to finish before the next tests on all threads
could execute. If one of the cores was done with its test and was free for the next, it would
have to wait for all other threads in the same locality to finish their tests. Therefore, this
would be an inefficient approach that does not make use of available resources properly.
Another method that could come to mind is creating as many futures as required reads
per node (usually in order of hundreads of thousands) on each locality and have HPX
handle running all of those futures and return the results. Again in this case since the
distribution on all nodes have been already achieved, and as HPX handles threads on a
locality automatically, parallelization could seem complete. But this is also an inefficient
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approach that can even cause nodes to go offline. The reason is, creating each future spawns
a new thread, causing the overflow of threads on the operating system.
the number of futures created on each locality is equal to the number of cores (threads
returned by HPX) of that locality, because running more threads than the number of
processors would only result in worse performance. the maximum number of threads that
a node runs concurrently is equal to the number of its cores. So, increasing the number of
futures, hence threads, will only cause the operating system to schedule multiple threads
on the same core and switch between them in order to run them all. This slows down the
cores since the overhead of scheduling is also added to the processor’s workload. Therefore,
the optimum performance is achieved when there is one thread running on each processor
of a locality.
After all cores of all nodes are designated a certain range of read numbers to test
independently, each core starts the fuzzing process for designated read numbers combined
with all mutations. The fuzzer module is called using HPX Process, and the required read
and mutation that should be tested are passed to it via this HPX component. Among
the parameters passed to the fuzzer module, is the path to log file. The path name of log
file for each thread is made up of the name of tested plugin, locality ID, and thread ID.
Therefore, although all localities and threads on the cluster have shared access to log files
directory, they do not write their logs to the same file. This prevents any distortion in the
output that can be caused by two threads writing to a file at the same time. It also makes
analyzing the outputs and tracking logs much easier. On the other hand, the memory
sample file that memory forensics frameworks running on all threads read and analyze, is a
single file in a single directory. Accessing the same file for opening and reading by several
threads on different threads and localities does not pose any harm and therefore, there is
only one sample file for all the tests that mutate it.
The Process component provides the ability to know when the execution of an outside
process (fuzzer module in this case) is complete. This feature is provided by wait for exit
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function, which blocks the caller thread until the called process has finished executing.
HPX also provides wait functions for futures, so that the completion of futures can be
visible to the caller. There are wait functions that wait for one future to finish and return,
and there are wait functions that wait for a set of futures and return after all futures of
the set have completed. Wait functions are either callback or non-callback. Callback wait
functions take an extra argument that specifies a method to be called when each future
returns. The fuzzer in this work uses wait functions to block for all threads in each locality
to finish, and to block until all localities are done with their designated tests. Figure 4.1.
shows the current architecture of our distributed fuzzer.

Figure 4.1. High performance fuzzing architecture
Our current environment is a homogeneous system where all processors that we use
are the same. Nevertheless, 360 of the compute nodes of the supercomputer that we are
currently using have 2 Intel Xeon Phi 7120P coprocessors. 20 of these compute nodes have

39

1 Intel Xeon Phi 7120P coprocessor and 1 NVIDIA Tesla K20X. These coprocessors can
be taken advantage of using HPX especially since it is capable of handling portability of
heterogeneous systems very well.
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Chapter 5.
Results
Results of this research are presented in terms of performance of fuzzing and the errors
that the fuzzer has discovered. So far we have tested 11 Windows plugins, 2 mac plugins
and 1 Linux plugin of Volatility framework. Because of the difference in the analysis done
by different plugins, their operations and hence the numbers of read calls made by them
are different. Our tests are performed on read system calls of the program under test. So,
the final number of tests that we run on each plugin depends on the number of read calls
performed by that plugin.
A total number of 2858752 tests were run on 14 plugins. Out of these executions, 88325
in total crashed with errors, 454 resulted in timeout, 128 resulted in creation of too large
output files, and 7 resulted in too long output results. There were also numerous cases of
anomalous outputs with normal exit codes almost all of which were not significant since
Volatility detected the wrong input and exited just without producing an error. a summary
of the number of tests and errors and their results is given in table 5.1..
These results are fetched automatically after tests from log files. The fuzzer saves the
output printed by Volatility, the exit code, read number and mutation of each test in log
files. These log files then go through text analysis and the errors and stats of tests are
retrieved from the analysis. After getting all the errors that occurred, a series of semimanual analyses are performed on the outputs to find anomalous cases that did not crash
Volatility, but may show strange activity.
The exit with error cases include errors thrown by Volatility as a result of detecting
corrupt input, and unhandled exceptions in Volatility. The first type of errors has the
desired behavior and is in fact the most accurate output for corrupt files. An example of
these cases is shown in figure 5.1. which occurred by applying the 1st mutation (change
all bytes to 0x00) on 16478th read of threads plugin. Many mutations result in changed,
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Table 5.1. Number of tests and resulting errors for Volatility plugins
Plugin

executions exit with error Timeout crashes

large output file

atoms

184608

1286

17

N/A

drivermodule

102912

104

0

N/A

impscan

20992

20913

0

N/A

threads

44797

562

0

N/A

procdump

221158

12711

32

128

sockscan

17280

0

0

N/A

pslist

245664

421

0

N/A

dlllist

120913

9

0

N/A

ldrmodule

79963

3147

0

N/A

timers

349184

4626

0

N/A

deskscan

348935

1079

436

N/A

mac kevents

622272

631

60

N/A

linux psscan

342272

0

0

N/A

mac ldrmodules

157802

42836

0

N/A

yet valid input files where for example only one field has taken a different value. These
mutations cannot and do not need to be detected by a memory analysis tool, neither is
it necessary for the fuzzer to expect a meaningful error message for every mutation. The
fuzzer rather tries to avoid these mutations by jumping over a couple of subsequent reads
to get to reads whose mutations result in “interesting outputs“.
Crashes of importance can be found among the cases in exit with error. They are
reported by the operating systems as unhandled exceptions and their stack traces are
stored in the log files. One example is shown in figure 5.2. where the 1st mutation is
applied on 26787th read and the mutated buffer resulted in incorrect string format which
was not checked by Volatility leading to its crash.
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Figure 5.1. Threads plugin crash

Figure 5.2. Atoms plugin crash
Another example can be seen in image 5.3. where mutation 26 (mutate current plus 4096 fill)
–which means add every byte in the read buffer to 0x1000 –was applied on 524th read while
the atoms plugin of Volatility was running.
Another set of significant findings of the fuzzer are resource exhaustion cases. Four
of the tested plugins entered a near infinite loop in some read-mutation combinations
which caused the fuzzer to time out on them and terminate the execution. The timeout
configuration was 3600 seconds for these executions, while the response time of Volatility
was significantly less. For plugin mac kevents as an example, the average response time was
108.92 seconds. Table 5.2. shows the read number and mutation combinations when the
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Figure 5.3. Atoms plugin crash
timeout cases happened. As can be seen, all 60 time out crashes happen while mutating 11
reads. This means the data that is accessed during those reads can affect the performance
of Volatility critically.
Table 5.2. Mutation-read combinations causing mac kevent to timeout
Mutation

Read

4

14716

12,13

5979

8,9,12,13

6018

12,13

7536

12,13

10158

8,9,12,13

10197

8,9,12,13

16203

22,27

16205

6,10,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,23,24,25,28,29,30,31

16206

8,9,

16229

8,9,12,13

16268

6,10,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,23,24,25,28,29,30,31

18389

In addition to timed out cases, there were executions that finished within less time
than the time-out, but resulted in very long outputs. These resource exhaustion problems
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usually happen when the mutated buffer is supposed to store the size of an element to
be read and it is mutated to a large value. Such cases were found in plugins atoms and
threads.
One of the plugins that we have tested so far creates dump files. plugin procdump
is a Windows plugin that finds the mapped processes on memory and dumps them as
executable files on disk. The process id of a specific process can be passed as a parameter
to procdump for it to dump that process only, or it can be called without parameters to
dump all processes as different executable files in a directory. It prints the list of files that
it dumps as its output. In our test, procdump was called without parameters to store the
dumps of all processes. After each completion of running the plugin, the sizes of dumped
files are obtained and if they are larger than 100 MB, the test environments are stored.
Out of 221158 tests on procdump, 128 created dump files larger than the threshold in our
current configuration. These are cases of file system exhaustion and are usually a result of
a pointer being mutated to address invalid data resulting in returning a wide address range
as the process’s memory space. a sample of reported large files is shown in figure 5.4..

Figure 5.4. Large files produced by the procdump plugin
There were numerous runs that exited normally but had some warning messages printed
in their outputs. These are example of Volatility handling invalid data and reporting
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it, while extracting all other information from the memory sample. These cases can be
easily used in forensics automated solutions since Volatility’s output is comprehensive. An
example of such cases is shown in figure 5.5. where 1st mutation is applied on 561670th
read when executing plugin ldrmodule. The plugin first prints as much information as can
be extracted(the long output is trimmed from top) and then outputs warning about the
corrupt input and exits normally.

Figure 5.5. ldrmodule warning output
There were also a large number of cases with strange outputs that exited with normal
exit codes, cases that printed only a few lines of output and exited normally, and cases that
did not print any outputs and exited normally. Many of these cases were analyzed and
were deemed insignificant findings since they resulted in inputs that Volatility found invalid
and terminated its execution as a result. Although Volatility did not output any errors for
these tests, it did detect they were invalid. Volatility did not crash or run into any other
problems either. Therefore, they are not test cases that exhibit any vulnerabilities. Figure
5.6. shows an example of such cases.
The fuzzer in this work was run on one of Louisiana State University’s supercomputers
called SuperMIC. SuperMIC contains a total number of 382 nodes running Red Hat Enterprise 6.9, each with two 10-core 2.8GHz Intel Ivy Bridge-EP processors. 380 compute nodes
each have 64 GB of memory and 500 GB of local HDD storage. 360 of the compute nodes
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Figure 5.6. Normal exit in drivermodule test
have 2 Intel Xeon Phi 7120P coprocessors. 20 of the compute nodes have 1 Intel Xeon Phi
7120P coprocessor and 1 NVIDIA Tesla K20X. The maximum total time of running a job
allowed on SuperMIC is 72 hours and the maximum number of nodes per job is 128. Table
5.3. shows the tests that were run on a set of plugins.
As can be seen in table 5.3., some plugins like threads, ldrmodule, and mac ldrmodules
are much slower than other plugins and fewer number of executions could be completed on
them along all their assigned nodes in 72 hours. Tests on these three plugins did not even
get to finish one round of all designated reads mutated with the first mutation to reach
the second mutation. The reason for this difference in plugins’ speeds is the diversity in
plugins’ operations.
The differences in plugins’ performances can be seen in Figure 5.7.. Here, the average
number of executions on all cores per hour is calculated for each plugin. A correspondence
can be seen between the total number of reads that a plugin performs, and the amount
of time that takes it to executes. The intuitive explanation is, plugins that perform fewer
numbers of total read calls, also do less processing. Therefore, they take less time to finish
execution. But this is not a definitive factor since plugins’ time consuming operations are
not limited to reading files. Besides, it should be kept in mind that four of the plugins
have had multiple timeouts in their executions. Each timeout takes one hour (can be found
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Table 5.3. Fuzzing stats for different plugins
Plugin

executions

reads

mutations nodes

cores CPU time

atoms

184608

28490

32

10

200

250:55:26

drivermodule

102912

15746

32

9

180

38:16:29

impscan

20992

3266

32

9

180

22:27:25

threads

44797

722216

1

10

200

376:45:16

procdump

221158

121020

12

9

180

781:11:46

sockscan

17280

541

32

10

200

02:07:24

pslist

245664

7677

32

5

100

268:43:11

dlllist

120913

271319

2

14

280

412:26:28

ldrmodule

79963

806512

1

15

300

358:50:36

mac kevents

622272

19456

32

15

300

353:19:00

linux psscan

342272

10700

32

9

180

309:42:20

mac ldrmodules

157802

238855

1

9

180

400:09:01

timers

349184

87851

32

17

340

205:40:06

deskscan

348935

10923

32

10

200

366:23:33

in table 5.1.). So taking deskscan as an example, 436 hours of the total time of running
this plugin over all nodes were spent for 436 of the executions, and the rest of the time
was allotted to all the other executions. Therefore, the average execution time does not
necessarily give a precise scale of plugins’ speed.
Figure 5.8. shows the resources used for testing different plugins as reported by TORQUE.
The plugins with heavy computation can be noticed here too. Average load shows the number of running processes per node. Maintaining a load equal to the number of cores gives
the ideal outcome in terms of the amount of jobs done. Because the maximum number of
processes that can run in parallel is equal to the number of cores in a node. So, having
fewer running processes than the number of cores means not using all the resources hence
taking a longer time for the same amount of work. Also having more running processes
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Figure 5.7. Execution times and read numbers of plugins
than the number of cores means imposing overhead on the processors, leading to jobs taking
a longer time for the same amount of work.

Figure 5.8. Resource usage of plugins
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Chapter 6.
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1.

Conclusions

Fuzz testing memory forensics frameworks is of vital importance both in terms of
software security assurance and reliability of forensic investigations. Our tests on Volatility
were able to find cases that crash the framework, cause it to enter infinite loops, or exhaust
file system resources. These findings of our fuzzer were cases that could not be found by
other manual or automatic tests. They were caused by changes in pointer references, data
structure layouts, and mapping information of memory samples. But inability to find these
crashes through manual or automatic tests does not mean that they cannot happen. These
errors are likely to exist especially in memory forensics where the analysis is performed on
memory images. As explained in section 3.1., memory images are prone to these changes
and tools that analyze these images must be able to handle such abnormalities securely.
Furthermore, much needed automated forensics relies on robust forensic frameworks
which cannot be guaranteed without comprehensive tests. Found crashes and errors confirm
the necessity of testing more plugins and analysis frameworks in order to ensure their
security. As more plugins and tools are tested and more vulnerabilities are discovered and
tackled, we will have more robust memory forensics frameworks used in investigations. The
results of these analysis frameworks can be affected if their vulnerabilities are exploited and
that can affect the results of investigations. So it is imperative that we perform these tests
on tools with different inputs and make sure any vulnerability is covered by us before it is
exploited.
Most plugins tested by far were Windows plugins, but we need to test plugins of other
operating systems too as they are completely different than their Windows versions due to
substantial differences among operating systems. We have been tuning the configuration
variables in tests based on the results as we proceeded in tests. More effective configurations
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will be achieved as we analyze and evaluate more test outcomes. Additionally, analysis
of discovered vulnerabilities can further guide the design and architecture of mutations.
Consequently, this lightweight and portable fuzzer which has a high coverage with fine
grained precision, has configuration variables that enable more guided tests and better
efficiency.
We have performed our analysis on memory forensics frameworks, and our drive to
develop this fuzzer was the urgency of comprehensive fuzz testing for these tools. But our
fuzzer can also test other tools, either closed source or open source, written in different
languages. it can test any tool that takes files as their inputs. especially for tools that
work with large files, such as photo and video editors, this is an efficient solution to fuzz
testing and finding vulnerabilities.
Our high performance computing approach enhances the fuzzing performance greatly.
The latency of parallel executions did not encounter any increase over time and all cores
continued running jobs throughout the tests. HPX has several features that can be leveraged to further boost the fuzzer. Its advantages of low overhead for computational intensive
programs and dynamic load balancing support scalability and enhancement of our parallel
implementation.
6.2.

Future Work

Running more tests on other plugins, other memory forensics frameworks, and with
more memory samples as initial inputs, is the primary outcome and future of this work. As
the current findings prove, there are important vulnerabilities that can be found by fuzzing
and we need to continue fuzz testing to cover all possible flaws. In order to make this
possible, the whole process of fuzz testing needs to become automated. That is, performing
tests, auto tuning more configuration variables as test results change, and automatically
analyzing crashes and exporting them. Adapting configurations to the results as the fuzzer
continues to test different pages of memory or different plugins has been an ongoing work,
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and more customization is going to be added to the program as we go on. The process
of extracting crashes is also automated for each log file. But the fuzzer needs to add the
automatic analysis of crashes and integrate all these procedures into one. The next step
in this procedure is exporting the issues and automatically ticketing them, so that the
developers are made aware of discovered issues as soon as they are found.
Another major future work is on high performance fuzzing. We are currently running
distributed tests and for almost the whole duration of tests all nodes are running with full
load and without slowdown. But we need to scale the distribution up and make it run as
fast as possible. There are many HPX features that can be taken advantage of to improve
our tests.
We are going to take advantage of the work queue based architecture of HPX thread
managers to migrate threads to localities where execution resources are available. This
is needed because we assign static numbers of executions to localities at the initialization
phase. But as the tests run, fuzzer might decide to skip a number of tests according to the
output of the program it is testing. So the number of executions to be done on localities
change while tests run and they will not remain equal among all nodes. This can result
in one node finishing all assigned jobs while there is still remaining work on other nodes.
Solving this problem is possible using HPX and it will be worked on in future.
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